

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BLOGGERS ROUNDTABLE WITH MAJOR SHANNON BEEBE, U.S. ARMY,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE SUBJECT: AFRICAN SECURITY
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LINDY KYZER (U.S. Army, Public Affairs): We're thrilled to have with
us today Major Shannon Beebe. He's senior Africa analyst, Office of the United
States Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence. He has a really great
presentation.

I hope everyone received the PowerPoint presentation and paper that we
sent out. If you didn't, ping me after this. And I will certainly e-mail it to
and make sure you get it.

He's here to discuss a new paradigm based on human security. Please
remember to keep that mute button pressed if you're not asking a question.
We'll start with Major Beebe's remarks and then we'll go to your questions.
Thanks so much, Major Beebe.

MAJ. BEEBE: Okay.

Okay, good morning or good afternoon, depending on where you are,
everyone. I want to just start off with a couple of remarks. And hopefully
everyone was able to get the presentation and the paper.

To give a little bit of background of how I began researching this,
this does come from personal research. And it's obviously not yet the position
of the United States Army, but a little bit of how this began.

About two years ago to the day, I was asked to give a presentation to
Army staff in the bunker on African security. At that time, the chief of staff
of the Army was General Peter Schoomaker. And I started off the presentation
with two quotes.

The first one was, Africa is a continent, not a country. And the
second one is that there is a reason that Africa is shaped like a question mark.
It's because we don't understand what drives and determines security on the
African continent.

General Schoomaker to his credit was intrigued and challenged myself,
along with a couple other folks, to go out and to canvas the Africa community of
interest and ask them how they do view their security.

What we came up with after 80 interviews, collective interviews -- I'm a political scientist by background -- was a coherence, a very strong coherence of about 90 percent of the answers.

The four things that Africans came back and told us, how they viewed security, was in terms of security sector reform, in terms of poverty, in terms of health and in terms of environment.

Now, that sort of put us in a quandary because with the exception of a little bit of the first part, that being security sector reform, that's not how the United States, and it's certainly not how the United States Army, views security.

So what I ventured to do over really about the next 9 to 12 months was to continue on this discover of, if this is not how we view security, how is it that Africans look at their security? And how should we adjust our paradigm? How should we adjust our strategic narrative, to more encompass how the Africans are looking at their security and to make us more relevant on the African continent?

Now, this is really where I came up with, began researching and doing my work on human security. Because back in 1994, the United Nations Development Program, they have a thing called the Human Development Report. They came out, and this was in '94. So remember, we're still, we're still lauding winning the Cold War. We're still, we're still basking in the peace dividend, that kind of thing.

Well, what the Human Development Report said is, as the tide of the Cold War and as the shadows of the Cold War roll back, what we're going to see in the future is that security is not going to be based as much on state-centric models, is not going to be based as much on state-versus-state type of engagement, but the insecurities and the conditions of human beings that create these insecurities across state borders. That was the beginning of human security.

Now there are seven components and, like I said, if you got the paper or the presentation, you know what those seven components are. But when I talked with audiences and when I brought this back to the Army staff, I said I challenge you to find one of these seven components of human security that doesn't directly address the challenges of Africa today. And those seven components were economic; health; personal security; community security, which we're seeing exactly that point as we speak right now in eastern Congo; political security; the environment; and food.

Well, then the challenge is, if we are viewing security as a system, state-centric, kinetic-based threat, how is it that we truly transition to more of a conditions-based security through the eyes of the Africans? And that's what I think that human security allows for, is more of a proactive type of engagement towards finding solutions before these crises become catastrophes and these catastrophes become combat.

Now, a challenge to this is very simple; that it looks and it smacks very heavily -- and as many of you have probably followed AFRICOM -- it looks like a military invasion of humanitarian space. It looks like a militarization of foreign policy. It looks like a lot of things bad if you're taking it through an old world paradigm.

But shifting this to look at security more proactively and in a broader expanse, including in those nontraditional security actors, what this becomes is a way of proactively engaging to use folks' different communities -- the NGO community -- to leverage the comparative advantage of governments, to leverage the comparative advantage of international organizations, to find solutions, again, before they become crises.

Now, again, the challenge to that is very simple, that these challenges, these conditions fall along the strategic seams of all of our institutions. So when we go around town here in Washington, D.C. -- one of the greatest challenges in Africa is water and sanitation, who owns water and sanitation. That falls across USAID, that falls across State, that falls across DOD. But what we have to do is get away from protecting our parochial Faberge rice bowls and start looking more toward how can we collaborate on these things, how can we show more transparency in our actions to find solutions before they become crises?

So that's sort of my opening salvo there. Would love to take questions from you and to talk with you and see if there's any other kinds of questions that you might have of me. So I'll stop there, Lindy.

MS. KYZER: Thanks so much.

We'll start out with Chris. If you're still on the line, did you have a question?

Q Yeah, actually I do. I only have a few minutes. But one thing -- I read your paper, Major, and I like it. It's good. But one thing -- I'm a political scientist, but I'm a quantitative political scientist. And one of the major problems I have is measuring human security, right, a set of measures or a single measure that we can look for and say that a policy has been successful or hasn't been successful based on the data. Do you have any suggestions or any kind of insights into what measure or set of measures would be appropriate?

MAJ. BEEBE: Yeah, thanks, Chris. You know, that's one of the questions that's often asked. And one of the things that's always pointed to is, you know, human security is soft. There's no quantitative type of measurements to measure security.

I would flip that around and say it depends on your metrics, which is the question that you're getting at. Traditionally, security-wise, what have we used as metrics of success and what have we used as metrics of security? You know, we've -- and I come -- I come from a background where, you know, we assess, you know, the number of divisions that are setting up on the border or how many planes and tanks and what types of arms that a country has. That has been sort of a measure of security. I would flip that around and say this. What happens if the metrics for security -- and again, my background is in Africa -- but what if we took as the metrics of security the secondary enrollment of female children in school?

What if we took as the metrics of security the number of microfinance loans that are going out into a town? What if we took as security the measurements of inoculations of children in countries?

Now, that sounds really, really soft, but again what we are dealing with, particularly when it comes to the African continent, are creeping vulnerabilities. These things do not fall along any hard metric of security

right now. But again, like the old Midas commercial, pay me now or pay me later. What we're wanting to do is see the benefits of paying now and reaping the benefits later on.

And that's what I would say -- it's a tough one because, again, these are solutions that we haven't looked at before. We've liked the quantitative simple, clean-cut answers. As we know with security in the 21st century, those answers are not going to be clean-cut. Those answers are not going to be simple. They're going to be a system of systems. I call it a house of cards. All of these seven components that I talk about, they're built on one another, and what you can't tell is, which card is going to be pulled out and what that's going to do to the structure.

What you are guaranteed is, something is going to fall down, because we're talking about areas that lack capacity. So when you lack capacity, you have to shift those metrics. So hopefully that answers in a roundabout way your question.

Q Thank you so much.

MS. KYZER: Okay. And Chuck Simmins, did you have a question?

Q Yeah, I do. Good afternoon, sir. Chuck Simmins from America's North Shore Journal. Yesterday we had the opportunity to speak with some Navy folks, talking about Operation Continuing Promise 2008, where they're sending LHDs into Latin America and providing humanitarian assistance and also disaster assistance. The thing that I see with Latin America is that personal security in your list of four concerns is probably less of a concern because the governments are more functional and more stable.

In the African context, wouldn't addressing personal security issues actually be a destabilizing factor on many of the nations in Africa due to the way that they currently operate and the way the people's needs in those nations are addressed by their present government? MAJ. BEEBE: Thanks for the question, Chuck. My short answer to that is no, and here's why: Personal security -- and again, we see this going on in eastern Congo right now -- is a paramount concern when you're talking about the African context. A lot of times when we talk about sustainable development -- and you hear that a lot around D.C. with a lot of the NGOs -- my answer is you cannot have sustainable development until you have sustainable security.

Now, why is that? Because sustainable development is a long-term strategic goal. When you are concerned about being raped, being killed, starving to death or dying of disease in today's context, you're not concerned about a 401(k); you're not concerned about a bank account; you're not concerned about sending your kids to school. You're concerned about tactical-level survival today. So that personal security is important.

Now, it also speaks to something that's a gap, a lot of a gap in our abilities with the military, which is training those folks, the police forces, that would provide for the personal security. Of course, we're restricted by Title 10 from providing police -- police training, but if you look at the context -- and again, I continue to hit on the example of the eastern Congo because I just got back from there a couple months ago and, of course, things are going really poorly over there right now -- you have a police force that is charged with protection of civilians, protection of properties and those kinds

of things, yet you also have a police force that's being paid \$7 a month. You turn a police force into a predatory force.

And so these are things, again, where we have to come together. We have to say, look, we don't have the comparative advantage. We have to reach out to the communities that do, even if it's a foreign country, even it's the -- if it's the Carabinieri from Italy, if it's the gendarmes from France, this is a serious gap in security.

Q Well, the Congo itself demonstrates one of the main issues in your argument, and that is every time we train somebody in the Congo, they take over the government from all the way back to Tshombe and Mobutu. And if we begin to train locals, we are, in effect, destabilizing the national government, are we not?

MAJ. BEEBE: Well, you know, I can see -- I can see your point there.

But again, you go back to the question of what creates the instabilities, and again it goes to the tactical level fears that people have. And particularly out in eastern Congo -- like I said, I've been there, and I've talked with some of the police forces -- they are looking to survive. And the problem is, when you don't have a confidence that if you're doing your job, that you're going to survive, and you're going to take some very desperate measures into your own hands. It has little -- it has less to do really with the training that we gave them, as opposed to the mind-set that they're fearing for their own survival. That's one that has to be a comprehensive approach. This isn't a one-off. No, it's not just police training. It's not just military training. It's not just working on health. It's a combination of all of those things, because again, security in Africa starts -- it's a mentality. It starts with perceptions. And when that perception is not there, as we all know, there's some very terrible things that can happen out of that.

So I understand your question, and I think that's why there has to be a comprehensive approach, because you can have the best health care in the world, but if people are starving to death, they're still going to do some atrocious things to survive. You can have the best-trained police force in the world, but if they're not being paid, guess what. They're going to be more likely to do things that we wouldn't want to have them do.

And so thanks for -- so much for the question.

MS. KYZER: Okay. David, did you have a question?

Q Yes, I do. Hi. This is David Axe with War Is Boring. Thanks for taking the time. This is a fantastic discussion.

(Pause.) Sir -- hello?

MAJ. BEEBE: Yes, I'm here. I'm listening to you, David --

Q Okay.

MAJ. BEEBE: -- and I like your War Is Boring -- and it can very much be boring, I think. So -- (chuckles) --

Q Right, especially in Africa.

So you know, this is a great theoretical discussion, but can we maybe talk about a case study, just to try to tease some reality out of this? I spent the summer in Chad, and one of the big lessons I sort of came out of Chad with was that no one in that conflict or those conflicts has any idea what's going on.

MAJ. BEEBE: (Chuckles.) Yeah.

Q That's all of the actors.

We're talking all the rebel groups, the government, the peacekeepers, the U.N. training force. No one has any clue who's fighting, exactly who's fighting who, exactly why or even how.

The way that manifests itself periodically is random gunfights, where people don't know who they're shooting at. But more broadly it's just, it's a morass of confusion.

It seems to me that to actually implement the kind of security strategy you're talking about would require a complete overhaul of the way we do intelligence on the quote-unquote "battlefield."

Can you give me any -- I know you're not really talking about intelligence policy here -- but can you give me any ideas, tips you would recommend, for how we can do intelligence differently or better, to support the kind of strategy you're talking about?

MAJ. BEEBE: Thanks so much, David.

Having spent some time in that area of the world, yeah, it is confusing. And I call this -- you know, when the violence continues to manifest on itself, it really just turns into a vortex of violence. And it is, no one really knows why, who they're fighting, why they're fighting. All they know is that it's a chaotic world. It's Mad Max in the Thunderdome. And it's, again, it's about personal survival.

But I would also agree with you. And you hit on a great point there, which is this, that the intelligence required of human security takes things very much out of the arena of the top secret, the compartmentalized information.

We want to flip that paradigm on its head which is, we want to share as much information as humanly possible, in a transparent manner, so folks do understand what's going on as best as possible. And this is definitely an argument that I get from the NGO community is, well, you know, what you're trying to do is again invade humanitarian space, and we don't want to be seen as lackeys of the intelligence community.

Well, the challenge there and one I present to them is, look, we're wanting to share information well beforehand, so all of us are on the same sheet of music or have visibility on the challenges, so we can try to find a solution together. Now, do I have any solid examples of how this works? Absolutely not, and that's one of the challenges is, when you look at a map of Africa, if you were to color code, if you took these seven different components of human security and you have NGOs and you have, you know, military working in a lot of these seven different components, if you color-coded those seven different components and you put them on a map of Africa, it would look like a bowl of Skittles.

Now, why is that? Because we're not doing things together. The NGO community; I go to a lot of seminars and a lot of presentations where folks stand up and say, you know, we're not doing enough in Africa.

I'm sort of the skunk at the party that asks the question, is it truly that we're not doing enough in Africa? Or is it that we're not doing enough together in Africa? And again if we're shifting our thinking to more of human security, there's more of a willingness to work together. There's more of an understanding that this is proactive, because the strength of human security works much better before things break than after they break.

And so for -- you know, I've worked a little bit with AFRICOM. I'm not a part of AFRICOM and obviously can't speak on their behalf, but I've tried to get this -- inject a lot of this thinking into AFRICOM, into their intelligence, knowledge, development section. And while this has settled in, that you can't take environment as something as soft, because the floods, the droughts are creating environmental refugees which are creating security and stability concerns. You can't take health as something fluffy and nice to have. These are things driving securities of militaries in Africa.

And so these have to be factored in to the intelligence; how do we gain the intelligence? It also speaks to the metrics of how we view security. So absolutely, this should be factored in.

Q Okay, great. Thank you.

MS. KYZER: And Greg, did you have a question?

Q I did. Hi, Major. I wanted to ask you a bit about -- I know you're not -- you don't work for AFRICOM, but just kind of a general question. Obviously, AFRICOM seems to be having some trouble getting traction. And was just wondering if it was a possibility that the U.S. military go in with more of a blue-helmet approach. I know they -- we currently provide training in some logistical support and peacekeeping operations, but why could we not beef that up and make AFRICOM almost a -- more of a blue-helmet operation, where we provide more personnel, we provide some of the airlift that they so desperately need and logistical support? I mean, is that -- is that an option? Maybe you could talk about why -- how that may or may not work from just your experience on the ground, there.

MAJ. BEEBE: Right. Well, and -- you know, and I think, again, not being able to speak on behalf of AFRICOM, but my research has very much indicated -- and I've talked a lot with -- again, with a lot of the NGOs, with a lot of the governments, with -- is this: Look, the requirements for security in Africa require really a command that is supporting rather than supported, that the true comparative advantage lies with folks like Project HOPE, lies with Oxfam, lies with these types of organizations, that the value of the command, it could be -- and again, this is for AFRICOM to decide -- but very much could be finding those gaps in capabilities.

And you hit it on the head with logistics. Yes, we can provide logistics. If that -- that is our strength, is our being able to command and control and our logistics. If that's what it is, and we can be the quiet command, and reinforce and support the work that is ongoing, to complement and to coordinate but never conflict with what's going on, we win. And -- absolutely. I mean, when I talk with NGOs, I say: Look, this uniform is not --

should not be the face of American foreign policy, nor was it ever an intention for it to be.

But because we still have this traditional type of paradigm that where the military is, the NGOs can't be and so on and so forth, we fail to understand the positive power of synergy. We fail to understand, again, the conditions that create these threats. And we have the opportunity now to work together before waiting until these things break. And I think that really is the value of, again, shifting this question away from the traditional types of security and asking the first-order question, which I don't think we've really asked: What is security for the 21st century, and what is security for Africa?

Q Right. Now it -- so if the American troops came in with more of a blue helmet, do you think it would be more palatable to those NGOs then?

MAJ. BEEBE: Well, again, I think it's a matter of dialoguing this out. And if folks are still looking at traditional types of security paradigms, it doesn't matter, because when I talk to the NGO community, it bothers them that we have CJTF-HOA drilling wells in East Africa. Why is that? Because they think that they're collecting intelligence. And quite honestly, I have seen some of the projects where, you know, they weren't necessarily well coordinated. This was earlier on with CJTF-HOA.

So again, we have to get the strategic narrative right. And if we're all on that same sheet of music, if we're all understanding, okay, this is the security language for the 21st century, yes, NGOs have a role to play; yes, the military has a role to play; and it's okay that we work together. This is, again, in a lot of the discussion, and what is really dangerous to human security -- everyone wants to point to the Iraq-Afghanistan model. Well, that's post-conflict. We're talking about the opportunity to do something proactively before conflict breaks out, because I would agree with the NGO community that there's an inverse curve that once conflict has happened, absolutely NGOs are less likely to want to work with the military, because they're more likely to be targeted; but before the conflict breaks out, trying to do something proactively, there shouldn't be any reason that we can't work together to share comparative advantage on that.

Q Well, and then the flip side, then, is the military's willingness to even get involved in that mission.

Could you just briefly talk a bit about that, perhaps?

MAJ. BEEBE: Yeah. Well, yes, because again, at the end of the day -- you know, back in the late '90s, we talked about, you know, the Department of Defense, United States Army, wasn't the world's policeman. Well, I would argue that it's probably better to be the world's policeman, being out there on the beat, seeing what's going on in your neighborhood, rather than being the world's fireman sitting back in the fire station polishing the fire trucks waiting for the fire to break out, and in the process starting more fires than you create -- or than you put out.

It's important that we understand, all right, we have comparative advantage. Our Corps of Engineers is a great example of that; you know, some of our civil affairs teams. But our job is not to take the place of NGOs when we're talking about human security. The job of the military isn't to take the place of the ongoing work that is already there. It's a matter of reinforcing it. So I think that there is comparative advantage.

And a lot of this -- you know, I talk in the Pentagon, as well you know, this is about beating swords into plowshares. It's not. But it's also not about pushing a plow at the point of a spear. It's a matter of finding that balance and, again, working together in a collaborative way rather than waiting until, again, the crisis breaks out and then everybody, you know, ad hoc types of, okay, "We've got this, stand clear."

Q Great. Thanks.

MS. KYZER: And it sounded like we had a couple folks join us mid-introduction. This is Lindy Kyzer with Army Public Affairs. Is there anyone else on the line who hasn't asked a question who has one?

Q I guess that would be me, Diane Amen (sp). I -- sorry, I'm getting feedback. That shocked me for a minute here.

Have you had any NGOs persuaded by your argument? It sounds like you're still in the persuasion stage.

MAJ. BEEBE: I think that -- yeah, I have had quite a few of the NGOs that have come up and talked with me. There is a concern, again, is why are you saying this and what is your intent? But one of the groups of NGOs that really have gotten it -- and I tip my hat to them -- are the conservation NGOs, the environmental NGOs. I've had a great opportunity to work for the past few years with World Wildlife Fund. I've had the opportunity actually to engage in dialogue with Greenpeace. That sounds a little freaky, but the reality is this; that particularly when you're dealing with the conservation NGOs, they're getting the connection between environmental shock and conflict.

They understand that you can't do this in a vacuum.

Great example is when I was in Goma. There was charcoaling going on in the Virunga National Park, the oldest national park in Africa, home of some of the remaining 800 silverback gorillas. There was real concern there.

Now, was it because these rebels that were in the park really wanted to destroy the environment, really wanted to destroy this international heritage? No. It was because they were starving to death and needed food, needed money to buy supplies.

So again, they start -- they understood, there are a lot of connections here. This is a system of systems type of approach. And there is a need to reach out to the military and to work, again, proactively, not in -- not in a combat kind of way, not in a kinetic force kind of way, but to use comparative advantage. So that's one group, is the conservation NGOs.

Q Can I -- can I interrupt there? As -- to take that concrete example, what would the military's role be under your paradigm in that kind of instance, the charcoaling issue?

MAJ. BEEBE: I think -- well, one of the things that I was able to do was to go in and to talk with some of the -- some of the rebel leaders. And there's -- there's a respect. Militaries pretty much have respect for other militaries. And to be able to talk with them and actually get to sort of the crux of "What it would take for you to stop, how -- what are the ways that we can get around doing this?" And just that very simple dialogue that the military

was concerned about this -- and again, this was in a personal context. I wasn't over there on a mission from the United States government.

Q Right.

MAJ. BEEBE: But being able to just come back and to understand, okay, well, first off, there's a need for the charcoal. They're selling -- they're selling -- they're getting money because there's a need for it. Well, being able to work with WWF and some of these others to take -- it's a pellet, type of pellets -- and substitute these pellets for charcoal and the cutting down of trees; also looking at, "Okay, you're starving to death; you're needing food; you're needing resources," those kinds of things, then being able to then go back into even some of the microfinance organizations and say, "Look, let's find some kind of viable legitimate legal type of -- type of job framework for these folks so they have some types of incomes."

It's -- again, these things completely fall outside of the realm of the military, but being able to at least go in as an intermediary to hear those concerns and say, "Look, we understand you're military. We understand what you're trying to do here, but what can we do to help here?" and then handing it over to the folks that most understand this.

And I continue to go back that I am -- I'm a huge fan of the work that NGOs are doing and it is not the role of the military to take away that work from them.

But where we can, we go and we provide those supplies. We provide maybe, you know, maybe a liaison team, whatever the case is, to fill those gaps, so we have a sustainable type of security.

Q Okay. And then if I can just ask you, the message that Lindy sent us referred to a report. And all I have is a bio on the e-mail.

Do you have a more formal report of this proposal?

MAJ. BEEBE: Yeah.

Actually we, Mary Kaldor from the London School of Economics and I, wrote an article that was originally supposed to be in Foreign Affairs. But they weren't going to publish it until about the middle of next year. And we're really wanting to get that out as soon as possible. And so we've sent it in to Foreign Policy.

They're reviewing it right now. But if they're not able to publish it, within the next couple of months, we're going to put it in Parameters, our military magazine.

But you might know, Diane, that Mary Kaldor is one of, really one of the founders of the idea of human security. She was actually responsible for authoring the report that went to Javier Solana, who is in charge of European security.

It's the Barcelona paper is what it's called. It's called Human Security Doctrine for Europe. And I've worked very, very closely with her on this. And again the intent here is to find commonalities, find ways of bridging gaps, not only amongst the United States and in our allies in Europe but also amongst the various communities of interest.

And again these are things that there are more, there are more questions than answers right now, because this is something new. This requires us to shift our thinking. But it's also very exciting because it's something that's proactive that creates something you want to work for rather than to fight against.

Q Okay. And then one last sort of housekeeping question, I came on right when you were talking about the U.N. report that listed the seven components. Which report was that exactly?

MAJ. BEEBE: Yeah. That's the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Report. It actually began in 1994 so it's called HDR '94. But you can Google it. It's there.

Q Which volume are the components in?

MAJ. BEEBE: It's, I think, chapter two is which chapter the --

Q But it's the most recent report then.

MAJ. BEEBE: No, no, no.

It's the Human Development Report in 1994. They do one --

Q Oh, it's the '94 report. Yeah, because I know they do an annual.

MAJ. BEEBE: Yeah. And they've got some great reports, and a lot of them -- again, based from 1994 forwards, they've done one on climate change, they've done one on water, very, very insightful. But again, this is more seen -- it's not seen as security, it's seen as development.

And quite frankly, you cannot -- you can't take the two apart. They're inextricably linked. And that's why it's important that -- that again, we understand -- start beginning to understand how to work together rather than work separate from one another.

Q Great. Thank you.

MS. KYZER: And this is Lindy Kyzer in Public Affairs. When I sent out the first round it had both the PowerPoint presentation and that paper attached, and for some very taxed inboxes, I got bounced back and just sent a chopped-down version. So I'll send that piece if you didn't receive it.

Q Thank you.

MS. KYZER: Was there anyone else who's on the line who hasn't asked a question yet?

Q This is Beth Wilson from Homefront in Focus.

And actually most of my questions have already been asked, but Major, I really appreciate your work and your effort. I'm fascinated by this new paradigm. Like you, I have more questions than -- I'm struggling wrapping my brain around -- and probably because I'm very Cold War-oriented, I don't know -- but wrapping my brain around how we can make the necessary paradigm shift to enact -- to effect the change that is desperately needed, especially in Africa.

MAJ. BEEBE: Yeah, well -- again, I think -- and this is what, you know -- as radical as this idea sounds -- and when I first started out this work, I mean, honest to God, I'm -- actually I'm getting promoted on Friday and -- (laughs) --

Q Congratulations!

MAJ. BEEBE: Thanks very much. (Laughs.)

When I started this about two years ago, I honestly thought I'd reached terminal rank because -- (laughter) -- these brows that were raised here in the Pentagon when I -- when I came out with this was -- yeah, it was -- it was a little disconcerting.

But that being said, what I don't advocate is this. I don't advocate a radical change in our bureaucracies and, you know, in our systems. And here's why.

Would we need something like that? Yes. But the reality of bureaucratic theory is very simple that, you know, bureaucracies resist change. What we need to do is find ways of making gradual shifts. And along this -- you know, I alluded to the -- to water. One of the recommendations that I've made -- and I worked on a panel with CSIS that just came out with a report on water -- actually, I think it's going to be published in January -- is, look, water's critical. Water and sanitation is critical for Africa.

But instead of just handing this to -- saying this is State Department's lane, this is DOD's lane, and then watching the food fights ensue from there, why not set up some type of standing council, some type of task force, call it what you will, but then sort of use the model that the OSCE has used, which is, you have one sitting chair, you have one incoming chair, and then you have the outgoing chair. And that could rotate amongst USAID, State and Department of Defense.

Now why is that? If you have a rotating chair, everyone has a chance to sit in the hot seat, first off, but people also become stakeholders. They don't look at this as just a DOD type of activity or just a State Department activity or just a USAID activity. People -- there's a motivation to get folks involved and start bringing in some of those assets, those comparative advantages, while at the same time rotating that chair around. And it's a confidence-building measure, because, again, a lot of this stuff -- it's a hot potato. When you talk about environmental -- or climate change and environmental shock in Africa, you know, you get the "Who's on First?" routine.

And so set these types of committees up and allow the system to adapt gradually. Our bureaucracies here absolutely -- it's not -- they're not going to change overnight. There's going to be too much friction set up with that. But you know, have these types of things where we build confidence, working with one another, and I think that's very, very important. And then that is how you can find collective solutions, because again, when you ask the first order question of what security is in the 21st century, it doesn't wear a military uniform, necessarily. Those conditions emanate from the insecurities of human beings, and those comparative advantages rest with a lot of different agencies, rest with a lot of different organizations. And so we have to find ways of working together, as best as we can, immediately, rather than waiting for, you know, that Goldwater II-Nichols act to come out or whatever the case is.

Q Thank you. MS. KYZER: Well, we're pushing our time here, so I think we'll go ahead and wrap up. Thank you so much, everyone, for joining us today.

And Major Beebe, did you have any closing -- (brief audio break) -- that you wanted to --

Q Could I ask one -- just a quick question, Lindy? This is Greg Grant again. Just on -- what kind of reception do the NGOs have to something like the Army Corps of Engineers? Do they look at them as military or "military lite," or do they have a different perception?

MAJ. BEEBE: Again, you know, my work with the NGOs has been they do have a different perception, because, again, you're not coming in with bullets, you're not coming in with military force trying to do kinetic type of operations. It's very difficult not to say that infrastructure means something to development.

It's very difficult not to say that infrastructure development creates more of a human-based security.

But again, it's a lot about comparative advantage and where the Corps of Engineers has that, absolutely.

And here's another -- I know something -- I didn't bring this up, but I'm glad you mentioned about the Corps of Engineers. We've done a lot of -- along the course of this project and also, you know, as AFRICOM stood up, we had -- we had a series of roundtable discussions with the African attaches, the attaches that are from various African nations that are here in Washington, D.C.

And one of the things that continued to come up that I was very surprised about was a number of the attaches stood up, and they said "We -- our militaries, the African militaries, are not viewed positively in Africa." And I thought, "Okay. Well, that's a pretty easy one to understand because, you know, they prey on the populations or, you know, they're part of the regime." I mean, this is my American mentality thinking.

No, the answer, they said, is the reason that the populations -- that they don't have a positive perception from the populations is because they said, "We are not adding to the economy. We are not adding to the development of our countries. Please train us in health. Please train us in infrastructure development projects. Please train us in ways that we can be value added to our countries."

Now, that really caught me off-guard. And I mean, I couldn't have paid for a better answer, because again, it's a matter of shifting from what we view as right for African security to more of how Africans view security as relevant. And I think that's important. And again, that's where we need to shift our thinking on this.

Q That's been great. Thanks. Thanks, Major.

MS. KYZER: Good. Did you have any closing comments, Major Beebe?

MAJ. BEEBE: Just thanks, everyone, for suffering with me over a speakerphone. And Lindy's got my contact information.

I am -- and one of the questions that came out was, you know -- you know, hard examples of how to do this. I'm going to be going over to be our military attache in Angola and my wife and I are planning on leaving probably about March timeframe. And I certainly hope that when I get over there -- this has been a great theoretical discussion. I truly believe in it. But I'm very much looking forward to working with the people of Angola, with the military of Angola and with the great country team that we have led by Ambassador Dan Mozena who really gets human security. And I would say, stay tuned, because I really want to be able to show how this works in practice rather than theory. And so please, please, please keep me on your -- keep me on your radar. And hope to have more opportunities to talk with you about real success stories once I get over to Angola.

Thank you.

MS. KYZER: Thank you very much, Major Beebe.

END.